A Schlemiel is the Elephant in the Room: The Framing of Stéphane Dion by Basen, Ira
Commentary
A Schlemiel Is the Elephant in the Room: 
The Framing of Stéphane Dion
Ira Basen
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC)
History will record that Canada’s federal election of 2008 began on a sleepy
Sunday morning in early September when Prime Minister Stephen Harper visited
the Governor General at Rideau Hall to request that Parliament be dissolved and
a writ for an election be issued. But in fact, Harper’s trip to Rideau Hall should
more accurately be seen as the moment when the first phase of the campaign
ended and the second phase began.
The first phase started on another Sunday, nearly two years earlier. And it
began, not with a prime ministerial visit, but with a TV commercial. The date
was February 4, 2007, better known as Super Bowl Sunday, and as millions of
football fans across Canada settled in to watch the Indianapolis Colts take on the
Chicago Bears, they were greeted by something quite unlike the usual collection
of slickly produced ads for beer, cellphones, and soft drinks.
For the first time ever, their football escapism was jolted by an intrusion of
reality—a political advertisement. The ad featured a clip from one of the all-
candidates debates held during the recently completed Liberal Party leadership
campaign. Stéphane Dion was being challenged by his opponent Michael
Ignatieff over the Liberal record on the environment. “Stéphane, we didn’t get it
done,” Ignatieff proclaimed. “We didn’t get it done.” “This is unfair,” Dion com-
plained. “Do you think it’s easy to set priorities?” The camera cuts to a shot of
Ignatieff snickering at Dion’s answer. A voice is then heard intoning “Leaders set
priorities. Leaders get things done. Stéphane Dion is not a leader.” Then, at a
slightly lower volume, and with faster-paced read, viewers heard, “This message
brought to you by the Conservative Party in Canada.
No Canadian political party had ever produced advertising to run during the
Super Bowl, one of the priciest ad buys of the year. But what was even more
remarkable about these ads was that there was no election underway at the time.
Stéphane Dion had only been chosen as Liberal leader two months earlier, and
though an election was always possible in a minority Parliament, few people
expected that the neophyte Liberal leader would take his chances with the elec-
torate anytime soon.
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Building the frame
So what was going on? Why would the Conservatives spend hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars to attack the Liberal leader when an election was not even on the
horizon? To understand the answer to that question, you have to understand the
art and science of political framing. Few people outside the world of political spin
doctoring have heard about framing in its political context, but it is critically
important in determining which issues will gain traction with the electorate and
which politicians will emerge triumphant on election day. And the Conservative
Party’s efforts to frame Stéphane Dion as “not a leader,” which began on that
Super Bowl Sunday in 2007, will long be remembered as a textbook example of
successful political framing.
The fundamental idea behind framing is not new. In marketing, it is more
commonly known as “branding,” and it has been a fixture in the public relations
tool kit for decades. In its commercial context, it essentially refers to those things
that consumers think of when they think of a particular company or product. Ask
people what they think of US automakers today and they will tell you that they
are companies that produce big, gas-guzzling cars that consumers do not want to
buy, run by a bunch of out-of-touch fat cats who are looking to taxpayers to bail
them out of their self-inflicted woes. Ask them what they think of the Toyota
brand, and you will receive the opposite response. Neither characterization is
completely accurate, but in the marketplace, brands are rarely about fairness or
accuracy. However, they are critically important for a company’s success. That
is why so much of what public relations people do these days involves managing
their clients’ brands.
The man who is perhaps most responsible for bringing these ideas into the
political realm is George Lakoff. For decades he was an obscure but highly
respected linguistics professor at the University of California, Berkeley. He was
interested in using cognitive linguistics to explore how the brain develops and
retains frames. In 2004, Lakoff wrote a book called Don’t Think of an Elephant
that became a bible for political consultants on both sides of the U.S. partisan
divide (see also Lakoff, 2004a). 
The book’s title lies at the core of Lakoff’s theory of framing. If he were to
ask you to not think of an elephant, you would not be able to do it, because in
order to not think of an elephant, you have to think of an elephant. Our frame for
an elephant is a large mammal with a trunk, floppy ears, and large stubby legs.
We have no way of thinking about an elephant that does not involve us evoking
that image.
That is because, in Lakoff’s view, our brains are hard-wired to think in terms
of frames and metaphors. They physically exist within our brains and cannot be
erased. Lakoff believes that about 98% of thought is unconscious. This means
that really successful political leaders are those who are able to reach voters on
an emotional rather than an intellectual level. They can tap into our unconscious
emotions through the use of frames and metaphors. This is what Barack Obama
understood better than any of his Democratic or Republican opponents in the
2008 presidential campaign. He was able to ride the two amorphous frames of
hope and change all the way to the White House.
298 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 34 (2)
According to Lakoff, Ronald Reagan was another American politician who
benefited from tapping into frames that the electorate itself may not even have been
able to articulate. Most Americans disagreed with Reagan’s policies, but voted for
him because the language he spoke was the language of family, hard work, and
patriotism. And in espousing those values, he evoked a vision of American self-
reliance and independence that had largely disappeared in the real world.
But frames are often not about the real world. After a decade of being
beaten down by scandal and military misadventure, Americans were prepared to
continue to suspend reality when it came to Ronald Reagan. The “great commu-
nicator” managed to preserve his reputation for honesty and straight shooting,
even as his administration became ever more deeply embroiled in scandal
(Lakoff, 2004a). 
Other politicians have not been so fortunate. Once a frame has been estab-
lished, it can be very difficult to change. It took Joe Clark decades of meritorious
public service before he could successfully lose the “Joe Who?” frame pinned on
him by a newspaper headline the day after his surprise victory at the
Conservative Party convention in 1976. Jean Chrétien remained “the little guy
from Shawinigan” long after he had left his small-town roots behind. Paul Martin
never could escape the damning “Mr. Dithers” frame hung on him by a writer
from The Economist. And now, the Conservatives are hoping lightening will
strike twice. They’ve launched a fresh series of pre-election ads against the new
Liberal leader, Michael Ignattief, trying to frame him as an intellectual dilettante
who is “only in it for himself,” and “just visiting.”
“Frame development,” Lakoff has written, “takes time and work.” “The
truth alone will not set you free. It has to be framed correctly” (2004, p. n.a.).
And that is why it is so important to be the first to get your frame established.
“Frame yourself,” the political spin doctors like to say, “or others will establish
the frame for you.”
Framing Dion
This is precisely what happened in that Conservative Party Super Bowl ad.
Although often referred to in the press as an “attack ad,” it should more accu-
rately be thought of as a “frame ad.” When Stéphane Dion won the Liberal lead-
ership in December 2006, he was as frameless a political leader as Canadians had
seen in a long time. Most Canadians had no idea who he was. He won the lead-
ership largely because his two main opponents, Michael Ignatieff and Bob Rae,
had some negative frames of their own that they could not overcome. Rae was a
failed socialist Ontario premier, Ignatieff an ivory-tower, globe-trotting, Bush-
loving war hawk out of touch with regular people. Dion was a tweedy academic
who seemed decent enough, and who cared a lot about the environment, but
beyond that, the public had little sense of who he was.
Dion’s lack of public profile provided a golden opportunity for
Conservative Party strategists. Their coffers brimming with cash, their oppo-
nents broke and divided and already weakened by the corruption frame
imposed on them by the sponsorship scandal, the Conservatives saw a small
window of opportunity to fill the vacuum and hang an unflattering frame
around Dion’s neck. 
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Enter Karl Rove
But to frame the new Liberal leader in a negative light, they first had to diminish
Dion’s credibility on the environment, an issue where Dion seemed more attuned
to Canadian public opinion than Stephen Harper. For that, the Conservatives
turned to the Republican Party playbook written by George W. Bush’s political
guru, Karl Rove.
The conventional wisdom in politics has always been that you play to your can-
didate’s strengths, not their weakness. You try to avoid calling attention to those
areas where your opponent might be holding the upper hand. Many Americans wor-
ried that Ronald Reagan was too militaristic, that he would be more likely to lead
America into war. So his advisors would never show him in the company of sol-
diers, and they eschewed photo ops on military bases or aircraft carriers.
But that was old-school politics, and Karl Rove had a different idea. You do
not sidestep around your candidates’ vulnerabilities; you confront them head-on.
You do not attack your opponent’s weak points; you attack his strengths.
The 2004 presidential campaign pitted John Kerry, a decorated Vietnam war
hero, against George Bush, a man who never saw combat and was largely a no-
show during his stint with the Texas Air National Guard. Most political strategists
would have avoided calling attention to Kerry’s war record, because it would
invite comparisons to Bush’s record that would inevitably be unflattering.
But Rove, using front groups like Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and the echo
chamber provided by right-wing radio talk shows and the blogosphere, was able
to raise questions about the veracity of Kerry’s accomplishments in Vietnam. The
accusations were almost entirely unfounded, but simply by raising them, Rove
succeeded in shifting the focus of attention away from Bush’s military service
record and on to Kerry’s, thereby neutralizing any advantage the Massachusetts
senator had on that issue. Kerry spent the last month of the 2004 campaign trying
to prove he really was a war hero. Nobody was talking about Bush’s military
record. Mission accomplished! 
And shifting attention is precisely what the Conservatives had to do with
Stéphane Dion and the environment. He had been ahead of the curve on climate
change, while Stephen Harper had long expressed doubts about whether the issue
was even real. But rather than let Dion own the environment issue, to frame him-
self as an environmental hero, the Conservatives sought to take the issue away
from him, to put him on the defensive, by attacking his record on greenhouse
gases while a member of the Liberal cabinet. Though he had been minister of the
environment for only 18 months, he would carry the can for 13 years of Liberal
“inaction” on climate change. On this important issue, he would be the man who
“didn’t get it done.” He would have to spend precious media time defending his
record on the issue, leaving Harper’s decade-long litany of climate change denial
largely ignored.
“Not a leader”
And forcing Dion to defend his environmental record dovetailed nicely with the
second objective of the Super Bowl ad: to frame Stéphane Dion as a weak leader.
Just as we could not think of an elephant without thinking of an elephant, we
would never be able to think of the Liberal leader without thinking of that
300 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 34 (2)
pathetic whine about how hard it is to set priorities. The visual image would be
the Liberal leader forever frozen in a confused, feckless shrug (Figure 1).
Contrast that to Stephen Harper, who during the 2006 campaign had talked about
his “five priorities” and practically nothing else, and the appeal of the leadership
frame for Conservative strategists is easy to understand.
Figure 1: “Not a leader” (the Dion shrug)
Source: http://www.gloriakovach.ca/Other/PublishingImages
/20071019-subpage-Dion.jpg
Of course, no frame can persist in the public mind unless it bears some relation-
ship to the truth. Frames may often be unfair, but they have to be based on some-
thing real in order to resonate. Joe Clark really was an unknown quantity with the
national electorate, Paul Martin really did dither, and Jean Chrétien did embody a
small-town sensibility, at least initially. 
But Stéphane Dion was largely a blank slate. When the Conservatives chose
to hang the “not a leader” frame on him, he had been party leader for less than 60
days, hardly enough time to establish his leadership bona fides. There was still
time for Dion to successfully counteract the negative frame by displaying tough,
determined leadership as Leader of the Opposition. Instead, he spent much of his
first year reinforcing the frame: huffing and puffing about how Conservative poli-
cies were ruining the country, then meekly standing up in the Commons to vote in
favour of those same policies in order to avoid an election that most Liberals rec-
ognized the party could not win.
The Conservatives took a gamble on Stéphane Dion on Super Bowl Sunday
2007. They bet he would give an Oscar-worthy performance in the role of the
weak leader they had cast him in. And by Sunday, September 7, 2008, it appeared
that gamble had paid off handsomely. No wonder the Harper team looked so con-
fident that day at Rideau Hall.
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Re-framing Dion
So when the second, “official” phase of the campaign began, it was largely
more of the same. There would be differences, of course. In the first phase, the
Conservatives had the field all to themselves. Party spending in a pre-election
period is not regulated in Canada. And the Conservatives could afford to spend
money on Super Bowl ads to brand Stéphane Dion, knowing that the Liberals
could not respond with a counter-branding strategy of their own.
According to Lakoff, “reframing requires a rewiring of the brain,” and that
requires “an investment of time, effort and money” (2004, p. n.a.). The Liberals
had neither enough time nor enough money to get the job done. Once the cam-
paign started, the party tried to establish a new frame for their leader. On their
website www.thisisdion.ca, you could see Stéphane Dion playing floor hockey
(and scoring a goal), hiking, fishing, and skiing. Ironically, all these images were
presented inside old-fashioned wooden picture frames.
But it was too little too late. The battle of the frames was over, and in many
ways, so too was the election. “Leadership” would be the ballot question for the
2008 election, and as is so often the case with parties and leaders on the Right,
leadership was the Conservatives’ strong suit. In power, Stephen Harper had
reversed his policies on several significant issues, and his government had proven
to be something less than the bastion of openness and accountability that he had
boasted it would be. But frame trumped reality in 2008, just as it had with Ronald
Reagan in the 1980s, and most Canadians continued to see Harper as a decisive
leader who said what he meant and meant what he said.
Figure 2: Puffin poop, a schlemiel, and the 
poverty of Web 2.0 in Canadian politics
Source: http://alterwords.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/0909puffinad500big.jpg
Stéphane the schlemiel
All that remained was to build on the work that had already been done in keep-
ing Stéphane Dion inside the frame the Conservatives had built for him, and
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whose validity he had so obligingly affirmed. The next step would be to create a
persona for Dion inside that frame. It would not be enough to frame him as “not
a leader,” a task once again made easier by the Liberal leader’s lacklustre cam-
paign. He would have to be cast as a clumsy fool, an object of ridicule. This
would be Stéphane Dion as the Yiddish comic archetype of the “schlemiel.”
In his book The Joys of Yiddish, Leo Rosten (1991) describes the schlemiel
as a simpleton. He is unlucky, clumsy and gauche, a social misfit, naïve and
gullible, who makes foolish bargains (a carbon tax?). Ruth Wisse, in her book The
Schlemiel as Modern Hero, writes, “[T]he Jewish schlemiel is a man who falls
below the average human standard but whose defects have been transformed into
a source of delight” (1980, p. n.a.). 
That’s why it is hard to know whether to laugh at the schlemiel or take pity
on him. Who’s a schlemiel? Think about George Costanza on Seinfeld. Think
about a guy standing in an empty field, a bird flies overhead, and his droppings
make a direct hit right on the guy’s shoulder (Figure 2). That’s a schlemiel!
Sound familiar? It should, because early in the campaign, that was precisely
the scenario depicted in a controversial ad that appeared on the Conservative
Party–sponsored site www.notaleader.ca. The party claimed the ad had been cre-
ated by an “overactive Web designer” and promptly pulled it off the website, but
not before it was seen by hundreds of thousands of people online and on TV,
rebroadcast as election news coverage.
That website, which invited users to create all kinds of content that mocked
the Liberal leader, was part of the Conservative Party’s strategy to utilize Web
2.0 tools to help the campaign to enable their campaign to reach out to people,
specifically young people, who used the Web as their primary source of informa-
tion. The campaign of 2008 was the first campaign of what has been dubbed the
Politics 2.0 era. For the first time, people could easily and cheaply create, share,
and distribute content on blogs, social network sites like Facebook, video sharing
sites like YouTube, and instant messaging utilities like Twitter.
The use of this social media technology would, its proponents believed,
change the political equation forever. No longer would campaigns be run by the
political backrooms. The old command-and-control campaign structure was gone
forever. Howard Dean, whose quixotic 2004 run for the Democratic presidential
nomination in the United States was the first to reveal the potential power of the
Internet, has called the Web “the most important tool for redemocratizing the
world since Gutenberg invented the printing press” (“Interview with Howard
Dean,” 2007). 
Politics 2.0—Contrasting editions
“The era of the ‘one-way campaign’ is coming to an end,” Dean told Mother
Jones magazine. “It’s not about communicating our message to you anymore; it’s
about listening to you first before we formulate the message” (“Interview with
Howard Dean,” 2007). The power of TV, of spin doctors, of marketing and mes-
sage tracks would all diminish in the era of “open source politics,” according to
the true believers of Politics 2.0. 
And in the United States in 2008, those true believers helped create the
extraordinary online juggernaut that helped propel Barack Obama to the White
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House. Obama used the Web for all the traditional campaign functions: raising
money, pushing his message, keeping supporters and the press abreast of what the
candidate was doing and saying. But the revolutionary aspect of Obama’s online
operation was not its ability to use social media to talk to its supporters, but its
ability to allow them to talk to each other, to form real and virtual communities,
to organize outside the framework of the campaign. It was a strategy that helped
inspire millions of young people, who had never before been politically engaged,
to come into his giant campaign tent. On his campaign website Obama wrote:
“I’m asking you to believe. Not just in my ability to bring about real change in
Washington. . . . I’m asking you to believe in yours.” He was not just running a
campaign—he was using the Web to create a political movement. 
But if the Obama campaign represented the full maturation of Politics 2.0
(although new technologies will undoubtedly push the frontiers even further in
the future), the Canadian campaign of 2008 showed all the signs of teenage awk-
wardness. There has been plenty of hype about the power of social media to pro-
foundly affect the way politics is practised, but the reality is that despite the
Internet, the 2008 election unfolded much like the previous ones.
In the past, only partisans designated by the campaign office could appear on
cable news political panels to spin the party line and heap scorn on their oppo-
nents. Now, hundreds of political bloggers got to shout online, but without a
moderator to remind them not to all speak at once. Not surprisingly, this did not
lead to an improvement in the quality of political discourse.
There was little in the Canadian 2008 campaign to indicate that either the par-
ties or their supporters really understood the lessons of the Obama campaign or
really believed in open-source politics. All the parties had their requisite
Facebook and YouTube pages, and some had even discovered Twitter, but they
used these Web 2.0 applications in very traditional ways to push messages out
and engage in one-way communications. Allowing partisans to create online neg-
ative ads targeted at the Opposition, as the Conservatives did at
www.notaleader.ca, hardly fulfills the transformational promise of Politics 2.0.
By and large, Canadian parties failed to understand how the Web could
engage people around issues and bring people, especially younger voters, into
the political process. Or perhaps they did understand, but decided it was a road
they would rather not travel. Obsessive control over the messages and images
coming off of the campaign bus has been one of the keys to political success ever
since the 1960s, when television began to dominate political coverage. An entire
generation of political spin doctors has grown up living in fear of the campaign
going “off message”—and believing that solidifying their existing base is easier
and less politically risky than trying to expand that base. That mindset will be
hard to erase.
Old politics over new
The consequences of politics as usual in Canada were painfully obvious. In the
United States, election turnout among first-time voters was the highest since 18-
year-olds were given the vote in the 1970s (Rock the Vote, 2008). While in
Canada, turnout fell below the already dismal 42 percent recorded in the election
of 2006 (The Star, 2008). The lesson seems to be that if you give young people a
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genuine stake in the system, and they will participate. Treat them like pawns in a
cynical game, and they will choose to stay home.
In the end, campaign 2008 in Canada was a triumph of old politics over new.
The political spin doctors had once again prevailed. They had skilfully used new
and old media, and techniques borrowed from the world of marketing, to lock
Stéphane Dion into a frame he could not escape. They had used Web 2.0 tools
to create the illusion of openness and inclusiveness, while maintaining the old
command-and-control campaign structures and traditional message discipline.
But across the border, a new way of doing politics was arguably emerging,
one that will eventually find its way into Canada. Social media does have the
power to transform politics in the ways that Howard Dean and others have sug-
gested—and Barack Obama has demonstrated. But the old ways are deeply
entrenched, and the ability of political strategists to co-opt these new tools should
not be underestimated.
As in the United States, it will likely take a transformational figure to pose
a real challenge to the power and influence of the political spin doctors—some-
one who can convince millions of people who have largely given up on the polit-
ical system, or were never engaged by it, that they too can have a stake. In
Canada, that person has yet to emerge. And in the meantime, it is business as
usual.
Websites
Not a leader. URL: www.notaleader.ca [No longer available]. 
This is Dion. URL: www.thisisdion.ca. 
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